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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the contribution of technological change to changes in the
structure of relative employment and wages. Even if the nature of demand-side forces
is fairly clear – international trade being of secondary importance because of the
modest size of the between-industry employment shifts – the identification of the
fundamental causes of skill-biased technological change, the techniques involved, and
the manner of their adoption by firms is not transparent. Accordingly the skill-biased
technological change diagnosis offers no real blueprint for policy other than the need
for an increasingly better-educated labor force. The problems arise when one turns to
the here-and-now, that is, the position of the currently skill-disadvantaged.
Unfortunately, general solutions, although favored by politicians, are not available.
Rather, there seems to be scope for carefully targeted programs that offer successive
incremental improvements in the labor market prospects of truly disadvantaged
workers whose education, skills and training are a significant impediment to their
employment.
*Professor of Economics, University of South Carolina (U.S.A.) and Libera Università di
Bolzano (Italy).
**Associate Professor of Economics, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra
(Portugal).
†This paper is based in part on Addison’s introductory lecture to the Associazione Italia
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I. Introduction
This paper investigates the role of technology as a factor behind rising unskilled
worker unemployment and falling relative (even real) wages.  While much of the
discussion concerns the U.S. experience, we have necessarily to range much further
afield.  Policy choices with respect to the skill-biased technological change argument do
not in principle differ from those associated with the chief competing explanation for the
deteriorating position of the low skilled, namely, heightened international trade.  In both
cases, the principal emphasis is on ways of upgrading skills, since no-one should favor
trade protection or taxes on computers.  Given the secular rise of unemployment in
Europe, that region's situation is likely to admit of a wider variety of culprits and a
different mix of solutions (e.g. greater wage flexibility). Nevertheless, technological
change would seem to cast an important shadow even in Europe.
In focusing on the difficulties of unskilled workers, we will note estimates of
the scale of the skills upgrading that may be necessary in the United States.  At issue
here is the ability of the market to redirect labor from lower to higher valued
alternatives – the Mincerian correction.  If the market response is insufficient there is
the question of retraining versus income maintenance, or retraining versus subsidized
employment.  The long-run solution undoubtedly resides in the formal education
system.  But in the short run there is the question of how to deal with those with current
skill deficits.  It has to be admitted that in the United States, as elsewhere, these public
retraining efforts have not been conspicuously successful. That said, the increasing
number of quasi-experimental studies being conducted in the United States ho ld out the
prospect of informing policy by providing important insights into what works at the
demonstration level at least.  In the interim, we do know that there is little scope for the
massive manpower programs of yesteryear.  Apparently, we are going to have to learn
to be incrementalists.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we outline the biased technological
change argument and comment upon its applications in the United States and Britain.
Second, we consider limitations of the approach, drawing on some other pieces of
evidence. Third, we examine the policy implications of biased technological change,
reviewing U.S. estimates of the investments necessary to restore the relative wage
position of the unskilled workers and the impact of past public policies serving those with
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skill deficits.  Finally, we draw together the threads of the preceding arguments and
reiterate some deficiencies of the "accounting framework."
II. Biased Technological Change
The backdrop to the biased technological change story at least in the United States
(and Britain) is the rise in skill differentials at a time when the share of the workforce
with higher qualifications (say, a college degree) has increased.  Correspondingly, the
relative (and, in the United States, the real) wage of unskilled workers has fallen and their
unemployment has increased.  The rise in the share of more educated workers in
employment and in their relative wages is of course indicative of relative demand shifts
in their favor.  But these shifts could be predominantly sectoral (adversely affecting
industries with a greater proportion of unskilled workers) or more pervasive and affecting
all industries (such as might be produced by biased technological change).
Much work has been devoted to establishing whether between-industry or
within-industry shifts explain changes in the employment shares, via a decomposition of
aggregate changes in the structure of employment.  The aggregate change in the
proportion of skilled workers ( PD ) over a given time interval is given by:
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S ii =  is the share of total employment in industry i.  The bar operator signifies a
time mean. The first term on the right hand side of the equation gives that part of the
change in the aggregate proportion of skilled workers that is attributable to shifts
between industries with different skill intensities, while the second term identifies the
within-industry contribution stemming from changes in the proportion of skilled
workers within sectors for given employment shares.
Table 1 provides estimates of the two component magnitudes using data for
U.S. and U.K. manufacturing.  The U.S. study by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994)
covers no less than 450 four -digit industries, while Machin's (1996) British study is for
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a smaller sample of 100 three-digit industries.  In both cases, the "dependent variable"
is the change in the employment and wage shares of non-production labor rather than
skilled and unskilled per se.   (Machin also summarizes the results of using a finer
definition of skill structure based on education shares, and reports that the latter are
closely correlated with the non-production share; see also Berman, Bound, and Machin,
1997, p. 14).
[Table 1 near here]
On the basis of the table, it appears for the United States that there has been a
long-term shift away from production labor.  Thus, using the employment share measure,
the shift toward non-production labor occurred at the rate of 0.069 percentage points per
year in the earliest period, increasing to 0.299 points per year in the intermediate interval,
and to no less than 0.552 points per year in the most recent period.  As can be seen,
parallel results obtain when using the wage share, which is another way of looking at the
increase in the relative demand for skilled labor (given a Cobb-Douglas production
function, a rise in the relative wage of skilled workers would only be accompanied by an
increase in the wage share of skilled labor if technological change were biased in their
favor). On this basis at least, the suggestion is that skills upgrading rather than sectoral
shifts that might be associated with international trade (or deindustrialization) dominate.
At the price of some imprecision, in the standard trade model – revisited in the next
section – a trade-induced rise in the demand for skilled workers in advanced economies
would yield a substitution of unskilled for skilled workers within sectors accompanied by
a shift in the industry mix toward skill intensive output.
Some interesting historical perspective is added by Juhn and Murphy (1994), who
construct demand indexes for various skill groups.  The indexes measure the percentage
change in the demand for a particular skill group (the five quintiles of the wage
distribution) as a weighted average of percentage changes of different industries and
occupations, where the weights are the group's initial employment distribution across
these industrial and occupational categories.  (The indexes are adjusted for relative wage
changes, without which there would be understatement of demand shifts in groups with
rising relative wages.)
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It is shown that the relative demand for workers in the highest quintile of the wage
distribution grew faster than the demand for the bottom quintile during the 1940s than in
either the 1970s or the 1980s.  What have changed, however, are the between- and
within-industry components.  In particular, during the 1980s the within-industry
component accounted for the entire percentage point differential in demand growth
between the highest and lowest quintile workers.  In the 1940s by contrast, the
within-industry component accounted for just 6 of the 15 percentage-point change in
relative demand for skill.  In short, the within-industry component accelerated in the
1980s (but see below).  Juhn and Murphy (1994, p. 358) argue that this result means that
"factors such as changes in product demand and international trade had only a minor
influence during the 1980s."  Rather, the facts on rising inequality are instead consistent
with the biased technological change story (see also Murphy and Welch, 1993).
This latter interpretation is largely shared by both labor and trade economists (see
Burtless, 1995). Empirical work designed to determine the magnitude of the effects of
trade on changes in advanced economies, using either factor content  analysis or price
effects analysis, has conceded that trade effects have limited impact on the labor market
prospects of different skill groups in general and unskilled workers in particular.1  The
notable exception to this statement is Wood (1994, 1995.) Interestingly, the prices of less
skill intensive goods appear to have fallen only slightly, thereby limiting any downward
pressure on unskilled wages from this transparent source. Some price effects are even
perverse from a trade perspective, although price data is subject to chronic measurement
problems. Similarly, the increased supply of unskilled labor in advanced economies –
resulting from increased imports from developing nations – are too small to explain much
of the fall in the relative wages of unskilled workers. Alternatively put, the share of total
unskilled employment that would be employed in the tradeable goods sector in the
absence of trade appears simply too small to have produced the large relative demand
shifts observed in the last two decades, even allowing for feedback effects from declining
unskilled wages to imports. Also detracting from the trade explanation, quite apart from
the particular concatenation of rising skill wage and employment ratios within tradeables,
is the evidence of relative demand shifts favoring skilled workers in non- tradeable
sectors. Finally, demand shifts away from unskilled labor long preceded globalization.
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The technological change explanation has received more direct support from
studies that have sought to peer inside the black box of technological change by
deploying proxies for technology.  To illustrate, we will again draw upon the two studies
cited in Table 1.  Beginning with the study by Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994),
having earlier decomposed the increase in the non-production worker share of the wage
bill and total employment into their between- and within-industry components, the
authors regress within-industry shifts in the wage bill share (though not employment) on
changes in output and changes in either capital or equipment and plant intensities.
Dummies for the 1970s and 1980s are also included, given the finding that the change in
the wage bill share is increasing through time.  (A simple cost function is used to derive a
share of non-production wages in total wages, from which evidence on the elasticity of
substitution between production and non-production labor can (theoretically) be derived
as well as the presence of capital-skill complementarity.  This share equation is then first
differenced to yield the basic estimating equation.)
The authors’ estimates point to capital-skill complementarity and equipment skill
complementarity, although capital accumulation does not contribute materially to the
explanation of skill upgrading (see also below). Altogether, the independent variables
explain around 12 percent of the variance in changes in the wage share of non-production
workers.  Adding in technology variables – specifically, the fraction of investments
devoted to computers, and R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) –
substantially improves the fit.  The two proxies for technological change account for
almost three-quarters of the observed shift away from production labor.
Second, similar results are reported by Machin (1996) for 16 two -digit U.K.
manufacturing industries, using almost identical procedures but this time also presenting
regressions for within-industry changes in the employment share of non-production
workers.  Machin reports separate regressions for his two technological change
indicators: annual R&D intensities, and the number of innovations introduced/used.  He
finds that a one percentage point increase in R&D relative to sales increases the non-
production worker wage bill share by 0.07 percentage points, and the employment share
by 0.05 percentage points, although his results for innovations are only weakly
statistically significant. Machin also provides disaggregative regressions using Workplace
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) establishment data that allow him to evaluate the
impact of increased computer usage. He finds among other things that increased
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computer usage is associated with increased employment shares of non-production
workers and reduced employment shares at the lower end of the occupational
employment range. This latter result goes some way to addressing the criticism (e.g.
Bernard and Jensen, 1997) that important compositional effects consistent with trade
theory might be hidden at industry level, namely, that a skill sub-industry might expand
at the expense of its low-skilled sub-industry counterparts (see also Bound, Berman, and
Machin, 1998).
Another well-known piece of evidence consistent with the biased technological
change argument is Krueger's (1993) interesting analysis of computer usage and
occupational earnings.  He finds that working with computers (versus not working with
them) is associated with a cet. par. increase in wages of between 15 and 20 percent.
Moreover, his estimates imply that the expansion in computer use during the 1980s can
explain up to 50.5 percent of the observed increase in the return to education.
Finally, we turn to the role of supply factors in all of this, since we have inferred
that rising premia indicate that demand has outstripped supply in the case of the highly
skilled.  The best analysis here is that of Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman (1990), who
attempt to explain the deteriorating position of U.S. high school dropouts and high school
graduates using a conventional demand and supply framework.  On the demand-side, a
shift-share analysis of the change in average wages received by less skilled workers is
used (supplemented by a logarithmic earnings regression model with year dummies).
This reveals that between 70 and 80 percent of the increase in the earnings gap between
high school dropouts/graduates and college graduates over 1979-87 occurred within
industries, again underscoring the relative unimportance of changes in the allocation of
labor across industries.
The next step is to ascertain the contribution of supply side factors as well as
institutional factors (specifically, minimum wages and declining unionization) to these
within-industry shifts.  The supply side analysis focuses on shifts in the relative supply of
workers with different educational qualifications.  Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman first
examine the increase in the differential between college trained and high school
dropouts/graduates between 1979 and 1987, assuming there were no shifts in relative
demand.  Despite the growth in the proportion of college graduates in the overall
workforce, the ratio of college educated (to high school educated) among those aged 25
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and 34 actually declined after 1979.  The suggestion is then that part of the increase in the
observed differential(s) after 1979 could be due to this falling supply of young college
graduates.  And it is calculated that the decline could explain up to 30 percent of the
growing differential of college educated younger workers.  In other words, this amount of
the differential potentially attributable to shifts in relative demand is in fact due to a
supply shift.  Next, assuming that the rate of increase in relative demand was the same in
the 1980s as in the 1970s (when the differential was fairly stable despite a sizeable
growth in the college educated population), the authors estimate how the slowed growth
in the relative supply of college educated workers in the 1980s contributed to the change
in differentials between the periods 1979-87 and 1973-79.  It is reported that the
deceleration in the growth of college educated manpower can explain much but by no
means all of the increase in the growth of the wage gap.  In other words, the suggestion is
that shifts in relative demand in favor of the college educated accelerated in the 1980s.
Lastly, the authors estimate that although the effect of (declining) minimum wages had
minimal effects on differentials, the 13 percentage point fall in union density may have
contributed up to one fifth of the decline in relative wages received by low skill workers
during the decade of the 1990s.
The interest of this study is twofold.  First, it seems to demonstrate that an
accelerated shift in demand favoring more skilled workers and a reduced growth in their
relative supply combined to increase U.S. wage inequality in the 1980s.  Second, in the
process it quantifies within a unified accounting framework the contributions of a number
of factors making for declining wages among the unskilled.  As we have seen, although
this analysis is clearly supportive of skill-biased technological change, it does not accord
that argument exclusive domain. We will return to this issue.
 III. Qualifications and Points of Dissent
Despite its growing appeal in the U.S. and elsewhere, the skill-biased
technological change parable has not gone unchallenged. The principal critique has
been theoretical, while secondary criticisms have focused on the controversial issue of
whether or not there has occurred an acceleration in the rate of technological change in
recent decades, the neglect of other determinants of observed movements in skill
differentials, and the assumed exogeneity of technical change, to include the possibility
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that trade competition has acted as the prime mover. We next examine each point in
turn.
At root, the theoretical problem with the idea that biased technological change can
explain the course of relative wage and employment developments stems from the
imprecision of the argument. The principal criticism has centered on the issue of sector
bias, namely, whether technical progress has been changing by more in one sector than
another (Leamer, 1994). Where product prices are fixed and the situation is that of a one-
sector, two-factor (skilled and unskilled) economy, then clearly it is the skill bias of
technical change that alone determines relative factor prices.2  However, for a two-sector,
open-economy model with fixed prices it is the sector bias of technological change that
matters in determining wage differentials. Consider, for example, the case of a
technological change that makes a skill-intensive sector more efficient in a single
country. The reduction in production costs implies increased production of the skill-
intensive good. But the increased demand for skilled workers will raise their relative
wages and in the process lead to their substitution by unskilled workers. In equilibrium,
therefore, although the relative wage of skilled workers will rise the employment ratio
will be unaffected in each sector.
In an attempt to deal with this unpalatable theoretical prediction of trade theory,
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) introduce the notion of pervasive skill-biased
technological change, occurring simultaneously in all economies in the production of
some traded good.  The setting is again the open economy framework but now with
endogenous prices. In these circumstances, the authors assert that skill-biased
technological change will not only produce within-industry skill upgrading but also a
widening skill differential as well. Their argument draws directly on Krugman (1995),
who contends that where skill-biased technological change is pervasive, the responses are
equivalent to those of the simple closed-economy model with two sectors, that is, raise
the relative wages and employment of skilled workers. Under standard assumptions,
Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998, p. 1247) argue that "skill-biased technological
change releases less-skilled workers from industries, depressing their wages by
depressing the world (relative) prices of goods intensive in less-skilled work."
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Armed with this theoretical argument, Berman, Bound, and Machin then set out to
establish that skill-biased technological change in manufacturing industry has indeed
been pervasive. They first supplement the evidence in Berman, Bound, and Griliches
(1994) and Machin (1996) (see Table 1) with findings on skill upgrading for an additional
10 countries for the 1970s and the 1980s. On average, the proportion of non-production
workers in the sample increased by an average of 4 percentage points in the 1970s and by
3 percentage points in the 1980s. In all countries the large majority of the aggregate
substitution in favor of non-production workers was due to substitution within industries
(84.3% in the 1970s and 91.5% in the 1980s).3 And in the 1980s, for 7 of the 10 countries
evincing rising substitution the skill differential was also increasing. Having provided this
evidence of pervasive skill upgrading, the authors proceed by offering cross-country
correlations of changes in the within-industry proportion of non-production workers for
the two decades. The correlations are overwhelmingly positive, and do not seem to be
caused by changes in wages (i.e. a similar response of industries to a similar change in
relative wages.). Rather, the correlations appear to be driven by three industries:
machinery and computers, electrical machinery, and printing and publication. Separate
information from case studies indicates that these industries introduced major skill-biased
technologies during the sample period, as well as having the highest rates of investment
in computers in the 1980s. On the basis of this evidence, the authors infer that
microprocessors were likely the main cause of skill-biased technological change over the
sample period. Finally, Berman, Bound, and Machin turn their attention to developing
countries, arguing that skill-biased technological change is a global phenomenon, not
simply confined to the advanced economies. The counterpoint is again the trade model’s
implication that the relative wages of skilled workers should have declined in developing
economies. Their evidence is a graphical exposition of changes in relative wages and
GDP per capita for 24 developing countries over the decade of the 1980s, plus
corresponding changes in the share of non-production workers in employment again by
GDP per capita (this time for 27 countries). In the former case, it is found that many
countries within the sample experienced an increase in the relative wages of non-
production workers in the 1980s (the authors note that the correlation is "a precisely
estimated zero") at a time when trade was liberalizing. Similarly, large increases in skill
shares are observed over this interval (see also Richardson, 1995). Evidently,
manufacturing employment in developing economies not only grew rapidly but also
upgraded skills at the same time. Skill-biased technological change might have been one
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factor in this development. The authors concede that other sources such as increased
capital investment and capital skill complementarity might have produced this result in
less developed economies, possibly indexed by a seemingly positive association between
non-production employment shares and GDP per capita. (Note, however, the widespread
acceptance in the literature that the increase in capital investment for developed
economies is likely to have been simply too small to have generated the observed
increase in relative wages.)
Unfortunately, although these findings establish that technical change has been
pervasive they do not provide closure on the role of skill-biased technological change in
driving up the relative wages of skilled workers. This is because the underlying model
exploited by Berman, Bound, and Machin (1998) is something of a special case,
reflecting specific assumptions about production technology. Haskel and Slaughter
(1998) correctly argue that the effect of skill-biased technological progress on skill
differentials in the two-sector open economy is theoretically ambiguous, and that in many
cases it remains the sector bias of pervasive technical change that is the main determinant
of relative wage changes after all (e.g. where the degree of factor substitutability is
small). For their part, Haskel and Slaughter attempt to test the effects of sector bias in
skill-biased technical change by using the residuals from a cost-share equation (derived
from a translog cost function) for non-production labor. In other words, the focus is on
that part of skilled labor’s cost share that is not explained by factor price changes.
Measured skill-biased technological change is then regressed on skill intensity: If the
coefficient estimate on skill intensity is found to be positive (negative), the implication is
that skill-biased technical change is concentrated in the skill-intensive (unskilled
intensive) sectors. Haskell and Slaughter report for the United States and the United
Kingdom that skill bias occurred in the unskill-intensive sectors in the 1970s and in the
skill-intensive sectors in the 1980s. In both countries, skill differentials narrowed in the
former interval and widened in the latter period. Results supplied for a further eight
developed countries are more mixed but broadly supportive in that countries evincing a
greater (lesser) degree of sector bias in skill-biased technical change tend to experience
larger (smaller) increases in wage inequality.
This examination of skill-biased technological change within countries across
sectors does not predict the relative importance of factor movements within and between
industries, and does not therefore constitute a critical test. Moreover, if skill-biased
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technological change were largely sector neutral, as Bound, Berman, and Machin’s
(1998) cross-country findings might be viewed as suggesting, then there would of course
be little or no difference across countries in the sector bias of technological change. For
both reasons more empirical work is required on the importance of factor and sector bias.
Finally, lest it be thought that Haskel and Slaughter elevate the role of the alternative
trade explanation, we should note that in a separate investigation of the sector bias of
both prices and technological change, they find that prices rather than technology were
the dominant  force behind the rise in U.K. wage inequality in the decade of the 1980s,
but are unable to establish a firm link between domestic and international prices (Haskel
and Slaughter, 1989).
Turning to the issue of the rate of change in technical progress, there has of course
been little disagreement about the long run course of events. That is, the complementarity
between capital and skill is well established (e.g. Griliches, 1969). But if there is
consensus on the role of capital accumulation and technology in shifting demand in favor
of higher order skills through time, controversy attaches to the suggestion that
technology's impact accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. This is the timing issue. In
particular, Mishel and Bernstein (1996) have argued that the technological change story
must proceed beyond its typical focus upon broad employment and education
differentials to examine the entire skill and wage distributions (i.e. the demand for
workers at various education and wage levels, where the latter are also assumed to proxy
skill). The basic motivation here is the need to disaggregate.
Mishel and Bernstein's decomposition of within-industry wage inequality
proceeds as follows. Their dependent variables reflect annualized changes in two
measures of wage inequality, namely, between group inequality (or "education
quantities," defined as the share of workers in a given education  category) and overall
wage inequality (or "wage quantities," defined as an industry's utilization of low, middle,
or high-wage workers). Six education categories and five wage quantities are
distinguished, and separate regressions run for each.  The independent variables comprise
a technology vector and a control for industry employment growth. Three technology
indicators are deployed: the gross equipment stock and the gross computer stock per full
time equivalent worker, and the share of scientists in each industry. Each variable is first
differenced.
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Because the effects of technological change can take the form of changes in the
skill bias as well as changes in pace of technological change, the empirical model allows
a distinction to be drawn between changes in complementarities and changes in the
overall impact of technology through time. This is achieved by also interacting the
technology covariates with time. (Three time periods are recognized: the 1970s, the
reference period, the 1980s and the 1990s.) Changing complementarities are directly
revealed by the (two) interaction terms. The overall impact of technology is obtained by
multiplying the complementarities specific to each period by the average within-industry
change in the relevant technology indicator over that period.  Comparing these per period
effects then establishes whether or not the effect of technology has accelerated through
time. The reduced form model is estimated over just 34 manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing private sector industries. Separate results are reported for
specifications with and without the computerization covariate.
The authors’ estimates are not favorable to the accelerated technological change
argument, even if it is generally the case that greater levels of technology are associated
with proportionately fewer high school equivalent workers and fewer middle and lower
paid workers (namely, the bottom three-quarters of the wage structure). As far as the
educational quantity (i.e. education upgrading) regressions are concerned, the large
majority of interaction terms between the relevant technology indicator and the time
period are statistically insignificant. That is, there are no signs of the complementarities
shifting through time. Disregarding statistical significance, the estimates do not suggest
a more profound effect for technology than for other factors, such as industry shifts.
Furthermore, there are no signs of an acceleration in the overall impact of technology
(the  "technology effect," namely, the product of complementarity and the pace of
technological change). For females, the results with respect to complementarities are
much the same, including mixed effects for the individual technology indicators,
although there is at least the suggestion of some modest acceleration in the technology
effect.
For wage quantities much the same negative conclusions hold, but in this case the
result follows from technological change being less biased in the 1980s than in the 1970s
for men in the bottom half of the distribution; correspondingly for the more skilled
groups (the top 25 percent) technological change was less favorable. A similar result was
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found for the overall impact of technology. The pattern of complentarities for women is
somewhat differentiated from that of men – for example, the observed shifts were
uniformly adverse for low wage women in the 1980s and 1990s – but once more there is
no support for an accelerated technology effect adversely impacting the bottom half or
three-quarters of the wage distribution and favorably impacting the top half.
These findings are at odds with other studies of skill-biased technological change
as measured by computerization at a more disaggregate level (but see below). For
example, Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) report that rapid skill upgrading within
detailed industries accounts for most of the growth in relative demand for college-
educated workers, particularly since 1970, and that across datasets the rate of skill
upgrading has been greater in more computer-intensive industries (see also Krueger,
1993).4  Moreover, Johnson’s (1997) indicative calculations suggest this acceleration
might have occurred. Johnson first computes the overall skill level of the population
based on college and high school equivalents. The ratio of college-equivalent labor to
high school-equivalent labor is termed "relative skill supply." This magnitude can then be
compared with the observed relative wage for the two groups to gauge the extent to
which the relative demand for higher-skilled labor has been shifting. Specifically, under
assumptions of flexible relative wages and exogenous relative supply, the relative
demand shift is the percentage change in the relative wage multiplied by the elasticity of
substitution plus the percentage change in relative supply. Estimates of this shift in favor
of skilled workers are 3.6 percent (per year) for the interval 1963-70, 3.7 percent for
1970-79, 4.7 percent for 1979-89, and 5.0 percent for 1989-93. In short, the suggestion is
one of an acceleration in skill-biased technical change since 1980. But the movement is
scarcely dramatic and, taken in conjunction with Mishel and Bernstein’s (1996) findings,
might serve to reinforce the suggestion that the skill-biased technological change story
has more explicitly to accommodate the role of other explanations for wage and
employment development over the last few decades, the specific caveat here being the
level of aggregation in both studies.
It is of course appropriate to place some of these other factors in a wider context.
The lesser degree of wage flexibility in Europe vis-à-vis the United States is an obvious
starting point in any such inquiry because of the maintained hypothesis of full
employment in the preceding analysis.  At one level, wage rigidities would suggest that
unemployment across skill groups should be more evenly distributed in Europe.
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However, the correlation between changes in wage inequality and changes in the skill-
unskilled employment ratio are poorly determined across OECD nations. To cite just one
component argument, German workers in the bottom decile of the real wage distribution
earn twice as much as their U.S. counterparts and yet experience similar unemployment
rates. The explanation for this phenomenon is conventionally couched in terms of their
better training (Nickell and Bell, 1996; see also the discussion in Franz, 1999, p.21).
Although this distinction can easily be overdrawn (see, for example, Harhoff and Kane,
1997), the concatenation of rising skilled worker unemployment alongside that of
unskilled workers in the face of typically more stable real wage differentials does redirect
our attention to the supply-side component of the skill-biased technological change story,
and also the role of collective bargaining.5  Both issues have attracted more scrutiny in
Europe because of the greater analytical interest in structural unemployment in that
region and its stronger union movement. Manacorda and Manning (1999) argue that,
since there have always been shifts in relative demand, the pertinent question is whether
these shifts have been matched by equivalent changes in the relative supply of skills.
Using a one-dimension measure of skill based on observed human capital (schooling),
they conclude that the main driving force behind rising wage inequality in the United
States and the United Kingdom has been increasing skill mismatch. Little mismatch is
reported for continental Europe, which result the authors attribute to a better supply of
skills and more intense upgrading. By way of interpretation, Manacorda and Manning
choose to emphasize the role of labor market monopsony, it being alleged that centralized
bargaining and legislated minima in continental Europe are helpful in this regard,
favoring unskilled workers not only in terms of relative wage development but also in
relative employment (see also Manacorda and Petrongolo, 1999, for further evidence on
the skills mismatch in Europe). Note, however, that relative employment is only part if
the story. Another is unemployment – Krugman’s famous "other side of the coin"
analogy. Yet another is the effect of skill-wage compression on the supply of skills.
The contribution of collective bargaining to employment and skill outcomes is
made more explicit in the treatment by Blau and Kahn (1996), who use data on male
wages for a panel of ten OECD nations (including the United States). Key to the authors'
analysis is the manner in which market forces reward the productive skills of individuals.
Blau and Kahn first report evidence from on a regression of a number of measures of
wage inequality (the dispersion in log wages, various percentile differentials, and wage
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differences between high- and low-skill groups) on the degree of centralization of pay
determination – the other explanatory variables are the log of relative female labor supply
and relative net supply.  Less centralized bargaining regimes are found to be associated
with greater wage dispersion. The authors next report evidence of a tenuous link in the
sample between the wage gaps and differences in the relative demand and supply of skills
(after Katz and Murphy, 1992). Finally, they calculate that had the United States the same
distribution of skills as the other countries in the sample, the wage gap between the 50th
and the 10th percentiles would narrow while that between the 90th and the 50th percentiles
would increase, although overall wage variation would still remain much higher in the
United States than elsewhere.  The conclusion of this study is that although the countries
in the sample do not differ all that markedly in productive characteristics, those
characteristics are nonetheless differentially rewarded. Most notably, skills have bigger
returns in the United States.
We conclude on a rather pessimistic note pertaining to the endogeneity of
technical change (and wage differentials). In part this question is intimately related to the
debate between trade theorists and labor economists because of the allegation of the
former (especially Wood, 1994) that much technological improvement is in fact trade
induced. Interestingly, however, Haskel and Slaughter (1999) report that although foreign
price pressures have stimulated technical change in the United Kingdom the induced
technical change is sector neutral and hence – on their model – has little effect on wage
inequality. But the issue is much broader than this.  In reviewing the literature on
technology and wages at industry, firm, plant, and individual levels, and distinguishing
between the effect of technology on skill structures on the one hand and that of
technology on wages on the other, Chennels and van Reenan (1999) conclude that
endogeneity bias is likely to more of a problem in the latter area. Indeed, they argue that
"the computer-wage correlation cannot be interpreted as simply the causal effect of
technical change on enterprise wages. More likely it reflects the fact that the best
technologies are likely to be used by the most able workers who were already earning
higher wages" (Chennels and van Reenan, 1999, p. 31). That said, there is more research
on the endogeneity problem (as well as unobserved heterogeneity) in the wage literature
than in the area of technology, where there have been few attempts to develop
instruments (e.g. R&D tax credits) that ameliorate statistical problems associated with the
fact that firms make technology and skills decisions simultaneously. The wider problem
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is that there have been few studies of the manner in which technological change translates
into higher demand for skills, or has a basis in the supply of existing skills.
The bottom line is that, although skill-biased technological change can be
associated with the upgrading of the labor force, the jury is still out on the nature of its
contribution to observed changes in the wage structure (which is undoubtedly partly an
issue of sectoral bias). This more attenuated conclusion is mandated by the associative
nature of the test procedures adopted in the literature, still inadequate representation of
the supply side, and of course a variety of statistical problems (such as the endogeneity of
technological progress). All of this is not to elevate in importance the role international
trade – the independent influence of which is currently still modest on most estimates –
even if some evidence of skill bias in the literature is also consistent with a trade-induced
deterioration in the position of skilled workers. One notable omission in much of the
literature is the role of collective bargaining and wage policy for lack of a better word.
We have reported some progress in this area but the tests are frankly even less
discriminating than those employed in the skill-bias literature. Nevertheless, wage
flexibility is assumed in the standard models and departures from it patently need explicit
incorporation in mainstream treatments and will require consideration of a wider range of
outcome indicators than relative employment rates and relative wages by skill group.
IV. Policy
As a practical matter, the policy recommendations of proponents of the two
main explanations for widening wage (and employment) differentials in favor of skilled
workers – skill-biased technological change and trade – do not differ in substance.
Thus, both groups emphasize the role of education, training/retraining, and earned
income tax credits, inter al. Protectionism is seen as reducing societal welfare, no less
than a tax on computers. As a result, much less is heard today of trade-adjustment
assistance, certainly that financed by taxes on imports, and still less of import
restrictions per se. This is not to deny that remnants of protectionism linger on in the
notion of "destructive competition" and arguably in the social clauses of trade
agreements, but rather to argue that there is widespread acceptance that the benefits of
trade and technological progress dominate the costs. Yet, as Richardson (1995, p. 52)
has argued, the actual policy recommendations being mooted have something of an
appeal to parenthood! This is perhaps understandable, given the generality of the
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diagnosis of the problems occasioned by technology and globalization.  Expressed
another way, our understanding of the sources of skill-biased technological change, and
the technologies involved is too rudimentary to offer much specific assistance to policy
design.
There is of course broad agreement that greater resources should be channeled
into formal education, not least at the primary and secondary levels, so as better to
prepare the next generation of workers for the labor market. This is indicated by the high
private and social returns to schooling and the transparency of certain problem areas (e.g.
the role of adverse family circumstances).6  To be sure, analysts vary in the emphasis that
they would place on competitive innovations (such as education vouchers and changes in
tax policy to favor individual write-offs) but the consensus is there, underwritten by the
Mincerian notion of "universal complementarity" (namely, the positive association
between formal schooling and post-school investments). Vulgo: training begets training.
The consensus as regards future generations of workers breaks down when it
comes to formulating policies for those with current skill deficits. A useful backdrop to
the debate is provided by calculations of the scale of human capital investments necessary
to make whole the losses sustained by unskilled workers in recent years. Some such
indicative estimates have been made by Heckman, Roselius , and Smith (1994) for the
United States, where the earnings losses in employment have been most profound. Using
data from Blank (1994), the authors first compute the human capital investment required
in 1989 dollars to restore the real earnings of male high school dropouts and high school
graduates to their real 1979 levels. The second calculation is the necessarily higher
amount needed to restore the earnings ratios between these two lesser skilled groups and
college graduates, while maintaining the 1989 earnings of college graduates. The sums
are staggering: $426 billion in the first case, and $1.66 trillion in the second. They clearly
dwarf U.S. manpower program outlays, both actual and envisaged.
These estimates clearly overstate the investments involved if supply responds and
low skills become scarcer (helped by a likely slowdown in labor force growth). As matter
of fact, there are signs that the gap between college and high school graduates has
reached a plateau. Although Mincer’s (Wall Street Journal, 1996) projections of a major
decline in the wage premium enjoyed by college-educated over high-school graduates
have proved over-optimistic, history is on his side. Thus, for example, the supply
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response to massive shifts in the relative demand for skilled workers over 1910-40 was
apparently of a sufficient magnitude to keep the differential between the high-school
educated worker and his or her less-educated counterpart in check (Goldin and Katz,
1995). That being said, Johnson (1997) cautions that there will have to be a large increase
in U.S. college attendance rates after 2010 to prevent a rise in wage inequality because of
a new phenomenon, namely, the relatively high education levels of retirees.7
On the other hand, the Heckman-Roselius-Smith estimates are understated to the
extent that 10 percent is an over-ambitious return on the human capital investment. And it
is here that there are grounds for some pessimism. Although 10 percent is perhaps not an
unreasonable assessment of the return on training investments in the private sector
(Lynch, 1993), it may be argued that low skill workers are currently not being trained
because it is not profitable for firms to do so. There is the further point that almost no
government programs approach such a yield, although the disparity undoubtedly in part
reflects the selection by the private sector of those whose returns from training are likely
to be high.
Let us consider each point in turn. Heckman, Roselius and Smith deny the
existence of pervasive under-training on the part of (U.S.) employers. They make a good
general case, and back up their arguments with an interesting comparison between
apprentices in the much-vaunted German apprenticeship system and U.S. high school
completers (who have a similar quantity of completed education prior to entering the
labor market). Among other things, the incremental gains to completing each (versus not
doing so) are broadly similar, and the slope of the earnings profiles for each are even
closer. In short, considerable caution has to be exercised before concluding that U.S.
employers under-train. That said, that there are some empirical regularities that may still
point to under-investment, such as the result that past on-the-job training adds to
productivity on the new job but not to the wage on that new job.
It is of course conventional to speak of market failure in the provision of private
sector training. Such arguments have long been used to justify government mandates
requiring firms to offer additional general training. The standard externalities argument
(i.e. poaching) was undercut by Becker's (1962) theoretical distinction between general
and specific training. Becker’s argument does not admit of market failure other than that
arising from union wage setting and/or minimum wages that limit the ability of the
Technology, Employment and Wages John T. Addison e Paulino Teixeira
G.E.M.F. – F.E.U.C. 20
worker to pay for his or her own training via a lower wage, or from credit constraints that
limit the scope for borrowing against a higher future earnings stream. However, the
market failure argument has however recently been reformulated (see the essays
contained in Booth and Snower, 1996).  The key theme of the modern market failure
argument is that training is neither exclusively general nor specific. In these
circumstances, under-provision of training can result if there is uncertainty at the time the
investment is undertaken and if there is monopsony power. As a result, some firms can
benefit from the training of workers by others, thereby producing a wedge between the
social and private benefits of training.  (Additional theoretical arguments can of course be
bolted onto this revisionist apparatus to bolster the case; examples include labor-capital
complementarities and the interaction between skills and innovative performance.) It is of
course only a short step from acceptance of these arguments to arrive at the diagnosis of a
pervasive low-skill, bad-job trap, requiring intervention to shepherd the parties to a new
and improved equilibrium.
But it is one thing to locate potential sources of market failure, yet another to
identify the scale of the problem, and again quite another to design effective policies if
these are indicated. The U.S. empirical evidence simply does not really point to
substantive market failure in the provision of private-sector training. Here we broadly
agree with the conclusion of Heckman, Roselius, and Smith (1994, p.113) that "the lack
of interest in private firms in training disadvantaged workers indicates the difficulty of
the task and the likely low return to that activity."
But if it is not efficient by and large for the private sector to train workers with
existing and emerging skill deficits, what is to be done for those marginalized by the
broad market forces of skill-biased technological change and international trade? Bluntly
expressed, something has to be done. For their part, Heckman, Roselius, and Smith argue
that if it is not efficient for the private sector to train the low skilled, then the optimal
strategy would be redistribution/income maintenance pure and simple. That is, not only to
continue focusing resources on the highly skilled, but also to offer them heightened
support and then tax them to pay for the maintenance of the marginalized low skilled.
Alternatively put, efficiency considerations would contraindicate taxing the most highly
skilled to pay for programs aimed at the lesser skilled, since it reduces the incentive of the
former to invest in skills.
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Yet efficiency is not the exclusive basis for policy. Thus, it is widely accepted
(and ultimately conceded by these authors) that the work ethic is a basic value – fostering
socially desirable values among those who work – and is therefore to be nurtured. The
interesting question that then arises is whether worker training should be subsidized or
the resources instead directed into job subsidies.  Heckman, Roselius, and Smith see the
former as an inefficient transfer policy as well as an inefficient investment policy for
low-skill workers. Their reasons are not altogether transparent, although they seem to be
based in part on the authors' pessimistic evaluation of government training programs,
coupled with the optimizing decisions of the private sector not to train the unskilled. This
conclusion is in fact better directed at policies in respect of older workers.  More
generally of course, the flexibility of wages attenuates the force of the job subsidy option
for the United States, although not in countries characterized by wage rigidity.
The authors are quite correct in noting the low returns to these programs vis-à-vis
the private returns to training. (For an accessible review of these programs, see LaLonde,
1995. See also Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith, 1999) Abstracting from selection
considerations, the issue is whether this is the correct metric. If one argues that reaching
the currently disadvantaged is an incremental process, however, one may offer a more
upbeat evaluation for two reasons. First, although existing programs geared toward the
truly disadvantaged do not appear sufficient to lift such workers out of poverty, the
recorded gains in employment and earnings can be nontrivial, especially for adult
women, and pass a benefit-cost test (see Orr et al., 1996). One can view this as providing
an important (selective) first step on which to build and integrate such workers into the
economic mainstream. To be sure, there are some major problem areas; a classic example
being the palpable failure of Job Training Partnership Act programs for youth. The
second important point to make is that U.S. public programs for displaced workers as
well as disadvantaged workers are of considerable diversity. Out of this diversity, we are
beginning to discern the glimmerings of what may be effective policies (e.g. on the
sharply differentiated returns to the courses undertaken by displaced workers in
community colleges, see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1997). We note
parenthetically that many of the programs are being evaluated using experimental
techniques.
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Currently, although there is emphatically no training blueprint, the rich tapestry of
U.S. demonstration projects and mix of program services is both informative and as a
strategy has the decided advantage of helping avoid some of the classic government
failures of monolithic  manpower programs of the past. The basic analytical requirement
here is to make assignment to different program services truly experimental. On the basis
of such experiments, the comparative merits of training versus job subsidies can be
evaluated. And it may well be the case that new initiatives will indeed have to be more
intensive than in the past. There is decidedly no quick fix for the disadvantaged. But their
number is likely to fall well below the levels implicit in the pessimistic calculations of
Heckman, Roselius, and Smith.
We have said little about Europe in all of this. One reason is that much less is
known about the effects of manpower policy initiatives in Europe than in the United
States.8 In principle, it might be argued that presumably less disadvantaged European
workers (see section III) have more to gain from their exposure to training programs than
their U.S. counterparts. Yet we have little guidance from European studies as to what
programs work for reasons having to do with program design, and some clear evidence of
bad policies (see Lechner, 1998). Given the scale of some European wage-subsidy
programs, the deadweight, substitution, tax, and displacement effects analyzed by
Calmfors (1994) also seem especially relevant. One potentially positive development,
however, is the employment chapter of the European Union, by virtue of the open
coordination device, the identification of best practice or peer review, and benchmarking
at member state level. This new European employment strategy could well assist in
identifying programs that are particularly effective for specific groups with substantial
labor market problems, even if it would be unwise to view it as a purely technocratic
response to the problems identified in the present treatment (Addison, 2000).
Finally, there is continuing controversy over the effects of factors other than skill-
biased technological change (and international trade) on relative wage development;
factors that may be expected to loom larger in Europe than the United States and which
have spawned treatments  that take explicit account of unemployment. These vary
according to the break with the conventional skill-biased technological change (and trade)
model(s), and may thus discount mismatch. One interesting source of disagreement that
has arisen here is the effect of collective bargaining on unskilled worker employment and
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wages. Some observers claim that the (relative) position of unskilled workers is helped by
centralized collective bargaining while others assert that it is harmed (both by reason of
wage rigidity and overall wage development). Proponents of the latter view would tie
manpower policy closely to the institutional reform of wage policy, while supporters of
the former position would link manpower policy to demand side developments.
V. Conclusions
This review has focused on the contribution of technological change to changes in
the structure of relative employment and wages. There seems no doubt that skill-biased
technological change underpins much of the skills upgrading observed over the course of
the present century. There are also some indications of a (worldwide) technology shock
in the 1980s and 1990s, further favoring skilled workers but, to put it mildly, this
phenomenon is the subject of no small controversy. If there is considerable agreement on
skill-biased technological change as the dominant demand-side influence – international
trade being of secondary importance because of the modest size of the between-industry
employment shifts – its contribution to relative wage development is less obvious. At one
level, the skill-biased technological change story has been criticized for failing to take
account of trade theory, within which framework even the effects of  pervasive  skill-
biased technological change on relative wages are ambiguous. This criticism would
appear correct but at issue is the empirical relevance of the sector-bias in skill-biased
technological change argument since its implication of between-industry upgrading
seems contraindicated, unequivocally so over a longer time span than the last two
decades. At another level, albeit related, the supply side of the skill-biased technological
change story is under-developed. The analysis of relative wages within the skill-biased
technological change framework is typically based on comparisons of movements in
relative wages and indices of skill-adjusted labor supply, assuming values for the
elasticity of substitution between skill groups. This approach has yielded some interesting
insights (including, as we have seen, instances of a deceleration in the growth in supply
of U.S. college-trained manpower) but makes a large number of assumptions regarding
the labor market, including full employment and flexible wages that clearly do not have
universal applicability across countries and time. Similar issues also arise when the
analysis of skill-biased technological change is instead embedded within a trade
framework, namely, the assumption that workers are mobile across sectors. Further
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development of the supply side is evidently called for. Obvious limitations on how far the
wages of less-skilled workers can fall are unions, minimum wages, and minimum welfare
levels. Some progress has been made in integrating wage inflexibility within a skill-
biased technological change framework but has more often led to more general
methodologies based on mismatch.
The role of skill-biased technological change as the key (albeit not sole) demand-
side determinant seems unassailable. This is because technological proxies such as R&D
expenditures and computer investment have been found to have positive and statistically
significant effects on the employment and wage bill shares of non-production/skilled
workers in country and cross-country studies alike. Furthermore, this result does not
appear to have been driven by aggregation and, while the correlation may not just reflect
causal relationships, endogeneity is unlikely to be a major problem. In particular, the
rapid degree of within-industry upgrading of skills appears to have been driven by
computers. For the reasons noted earlier, we cannot necessarily say the same of the
positive association between wages and computer use. This conclusion is underscored by
micro-econometric studies that suggest the relation is highly sensitive to controls for firm
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of the innovation.
Even if the nature of demand-side forces is fairly clear, the identification of the
fundamental causes of skill-biased technological change, the techniques involved, and the
manner of their adoption by firms is not transparent. Accordingly the skill-biased
technological change diagnosis offers no real blueprint for policy other than the need for
an increasingly better-educated labor force. This 'solution' of a long-term commitment to
increasing, say, the share of individuals who go to university seems appropriate given
universal complementarity and is also favored by those who instead attribute skill
upgrading and the immiserization of the unskilled to international trade. Beyond that,
supporters of both schools would also allow for the corrective mechanism of market
forces, although we detect little conviction that market-induced supply shifts will suffice
unaided. The problems arise when one turns to the here-and-now, that is, the position of
the currently skill-disadvantaged. General solutions, although favored by politicians, are
not available here. We are unaware of any evidence to indicate that large-scale manpower
programs work, and the reach of this statement is not just confined to the United States.
Rather, there is scope for carefully targeted programs that offer successive incremental
improvements in the labor market prospects of truly disadvantaged workers whose
Technology, Employment and Wages John T. Addison e Paulino Teixeira
G.E.M.F. – F.E.U.C. 25
education, skills and training are a significant impediment to their employment and for
whom no Mincerian correction is in sight.
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Endnotes
1  The idea behind factor content analysis is that foreign labor input in imported goods
adds to domestic labor supply, while domestic labor input in exported goods subtracts
from domestic  supply. The impact of trade on the skill differential is calculated by
combining these labor supply shifts with separate estimates of labor demand
elasticities (see, inter al., Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1992; Revenga, 1992; Wood,
1994, 1995). Price effects analysis on the other hand eschews measurements based on
trade volumes in favor of trade prices, and is directly linked to the basic  Stolper-
Samuelson theorem briefly summarized earlier (studies include Lawrence and
Slaughter, 1993; Sachs and Shatz, 1994; Desjonqueres, Machin, and Van Reenan,
1997; and Fitzenberger, 1999). The basic idea here is that trade-induced price declines
(increases) in a sector make that sector unprofitable (profitable). Relative wages have
then to fall (rise) to restore the zero profit constraint of competitive equilibrium.
2   This is exactly the scenario assumed in much of the technological change empirical
literature. Thus the ratio of skilled to unskilled worker employment may be
regressed on the corresponding skill differential, where the skill-biased technology
parameter is specified as a constant term - or replaced by an assumed correlate such
as computer usage. In each case, a positive coefficient suggests evidence of skill-
biased technological change. Import penetration has on occasion been added this
sparse formal representation in order to gauge the trade argument (e.g. Machin and
van Reenan, 1998).
3   Similar findings are reported for the wage bill share measure.
4  Interestingly, Krueger's study has been critiqued by DiNardo and Pischke (1997), who
report that use of his methodology with German data produces the result that working
with pencils yields a wage premium no less than working with computers! Using the
German Qualification and Career Survey, which contains information on a variety of
tools used on the job, one of the authors' specifications suggests a return to computers
of 18.6 percent in 1991 and to pencils of 13.5 percent. Since everyone can use pencils,
the inference might be that the return to computers is a selection effect - increased
computer use picks up some unobserved skill whose return has also increased through
time - albeit one that is not easily identified with standard statistical procedures. But,
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in the final analysis, DiNardo and Pischke are more critical of the use of the computer
variable as a direct indicator of technological change than they are of the notion that
technological change underpins observed changes in wages .
5 Nickell and Bell (1996) attempt to differentiate between neutral shocks (affecting the
employment of all skill groups equally) and relative adverse labor market shocks.
Indeed, their estimates, using a CES function to generate the structure of demand,
suggest that adverse relative shocks account for less than one fifth of the average rise
in unemployment in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Canada, and also, interestingly
enough, the United Kingdom. The latter result conflicts with Machin's (1996) study
(see section II). However, Machin (1996, p. 145) does note that as far as pay
inequality is concerned his analysis neglects many important transformations of the
U.K. labor market in the 1980s associated with the radical labor market reform agenda
of successive Conservative administrations; changes, he admits, that favored non-
manual over manual workers.  That said, Nickell's (1995) parallel analysis, using
different demand specifications, confirms the dominance of relative shocks for the
United States, where they are estimated to account for four -fifths of the rise in
unemployment, 1963/68 to 1983/88.
6  For a review of the apparent success of high quality early childhood interventions in
yielding subsequent labor market benefits to the disadvantaged, see Heckman,
Lochner, Smith, and Taber (1998).
7   Much of the large increase in the relative supply of educated workers in the past was
achieved by the replacement of retirees with low average levels of schooling by
young persons with higher average levels.
8  For a review of 39 mostly non-experimental studies of employment and training
programs in nine European countries, see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
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